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1Th e Place of Archery in Greek Warfare
Th e Ancient Greek Archer:  . . . at work & war
by Tom Winter
Summary: Despite the ancient Greek equivalent of an Agincourt, 
the Greek military mind fi rmly retained the heavy infantry, rather 
than the archers, as the main force. Recognized uses of the archer 
in Greek warfare were to fend off  heights of city walls, to perform 
commando raids, and to provide covering fi re for commando-style 
operations. Th is essay, written after a fresh reading of the principle 
Greek historians, puts together all passages where one can see the 
ancient Greek archer at work and in his military setting.
When Pericles proclaims the catalog of Athenian forces at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (431–404), the array 
looked like this:
  15,000 fi rst-line hoplites 
  1,600 reserve hoplites 
  1,600 cavalry (including mounted archers) 
  1,200 archers 
  300 warships 
Archers comprised, then, roughly 10 percent of an ancient Greek 
city’s military force. We want to ask, of course, what they did with 
these archers. Th is in turn requires seeing the system of Greek land 
warfare.
Pericles’ list of forces lets us see the relative numbers, but is some-
what misleading, as it omits a major cate gory, the light-armed soldier; 
a man armed with shield and spear, but, un like the hoplite, not pro-
tected by body armor.
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Th e system of the use of all these will become clearest fastest if di-
vided into two categories, those who stand and fi ght, and those who 
can range over a distance or who have range and dis tance.
Th e hoplites are the Sherman Tanks of antiquity. Th eir armor is 
cast and hammered bronze. Bronze, please remember, is heavier than 
iron. Typi cally, if a hoplite is to run, he must jettison armor. He is not 
mobile, and is no ranger. Th e light armed trooper is naked but for his 
shield and helmet. He is called variously psilos “light”, gymnetes “bare-
man” or akontistes, “spear man.” Slingers and archers fall into the same 
category, except neither can, of course, both do his job and manage a 
shield. Generally, the psilos is, in fact, a ranger on foot. He can be seen 
in several Greek engagements running on a corps of hoplites slinging 
his spear (it had a long thong on its balance point, spiraled around it) 
and then getting out of counter-throw range, fast. Th ough the Assyr-
ian archers had a shield-holding teammate, the Greek archer seems to 
have been completely unarmored, de fended utterly by the range of his 
weapon. Th e cavalryman, hippeus, is variously armed with spears, sa-
bers, and/or the bow.
None of these can stand toe-to-toe with a corps of hoplites. For 
that, an other corps of hoplites is needed. Th is is not to say, however, 
that only hoplites can defeat hoplites. Far from it. We see most clearly 
what each “branch of serv ice” has for its proper use by watching what 
happens when a particular branch is missing.
Let’s begin with cavalry. Ten thousand Greek mer cenary hoplites 
had marched into the Per sian empire with Cyrus to help him wrest 
the empire from his brother (401–400 B.C.). Th ey defeated the Per-
sians at the end of their battle line, but as their employer Cyrus was 
killed in the battle, they were faced with hav ing to get out of 1,500 
miles of un friendly territory. Although they had smashed all oppos-
ing Persians, they were very dubious about their chances. Th ey had 
NO cavalry.
What did it mean to them? Th e Ten Th ousand all knew what it 
meant, and Xenophon expressed it this way:
“But since we have no cavalry, if we win we can’t kill anybody, and 
if we lose we all die.”
Expanding upon this, we can also see the advantage of the gymne-
tes: vic torious hoplites keep their armor, and cannot catch retreating 
hoplites who jettison theirs.
Fully armed hoplite.
The cutout becomes a view-port 
when the shield is up.
The attendant solves the
Assyrian archer’s shield problem.
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An interesting implication, which we will see happen in history, is 
that hoplites alone cannot defeat the gymne tes, who can always sim-
ply run away from them. To put the cap on a victory, the ancients 
needed the cavalry to run down and beat them. If defeated, the Ten 
Th ousand would be unable to es cape the enemy cavalry. One needs 
cav alry, then, to fend off  the enemy cavalry to cover the escape of over-
matched hop lites. Th e Syracusan Expedition, as re lated in Book Six 
of Th ucydides, is a beautiful illustration. Th e Athenian Ex pedition 
against Syracuse shipped no cavalry. Th e people of Syracuse were 
strong in cavalry. In the fi rst big battle before Syracuse, the Athenians 
won, driving the inexperi enced and diffi  dent Syracusan heavy infan-
try before them.
But no. Th e battle was indeci sive, for the Syracusan horsemen 
kept cutting off  the pursuit. Whichever part of the Athe nian front 
came ahead too far in pursuit suddenly had mounted rangers spear-
ing them and running. Th e Athenians “won,” but they couldn’t kill 
anybody: without cavalry, their victory was re duced to a stand-off , a 
draw! Th is is the extreme of the no-cavalry handicap.
On the Syracusan side, they “lost” but nobody died. Th eir cause 
was still safe: it was as if the battle had not taken place! Th ey had the 
ancient equivalent of “command of the air.”
We observe: Hoplites can defeat hoplites, but hoplites cannot de-
feat a combined force of hoplites and cavalry.
Th e next thing the Athenian expe ditionary force does, of course, 
is to send home for cavalry. Th ey do this, plus one other thing: they 
send home for archers for the express purpose of fending off  the en-
emy cavalry. To deal with soldiers with range, a weapon with range. 
Th is lets us see that the archer was a relatively cheap and easily trans-
portable means of dealing with a supe rior cavalry force.
A beautifully clear interplay of hoplites, archers, and akontistai is 
seen in the career of Demosthenes in the Peloponnesian War. Dem-
osthenes was an independent thinker. Settled with an expeditionary 
naval force off  shore of what is now Albania, he let the local islanders 
talk him into an expedition inland against their enemy, the Aitolians.
Demosthenes acceded to this adventure thinking of nothing less 
than conquering his way clear across the mainland to the northern 
shores of the Aegean Sea. Th e islanders told him that the Aitolians 
were just light armed, and he should take them quickly.
He did—at fi rst. Th e three towns were march-overs. Unfortunate-
ly for Demosthenes’ career, the Aitolians were retreating and gather-
ing until they had enough spear power to stop the hop lites. At the 
town called Aigition we fi rst see gymnetes defeat heavy infan try. 
Th ucydides’ description of the battle is called “a series of pursuits and 
re turns, with the Athenians at a disad vantage going in each direction.” 
Th e Aitolians’ single weapon, the spear, could eventually prevail. Th e 
Athenian force, decisively better, had to break up, jettison, and strag-
gle to the shore through the forests.
Archers? Yes, Demosthenes did have some archers. Studying the 
battle, one sees the passage, “Th e Athenians were all right so long as 
their archers had arrows.”
Adding the battle of Aigition to what we have already seen, we 
have as follows: Hoplites cannot defeat gymne tes. Gymnetes can de-
feat hoplites. Th erefore, hoplites need archers to keep the gymnetes at 
a distance.
Interestingly, Demosthenes learned and applied this lesson of 
Aig ition in his next adventure, at Pylos and its near off shore island, 
Greek mounted archer at work
discouraging hoplite pursuit.
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Sphacteria. Sphacteria was a small island, long and narrow, on the 
west coast of Peloponnese. Its length sheltered, and all but shut off , 
the bays of Pylos from the sea. Th e bayshore included a rising bit of 
cliff , in which Demosthenes recognized a strategic opportunity. His 
expedition force fortifi ed the place. Th is put a spear at the Spartan 
throat, as the place was but 40 miles from Sparta.
Th e Spartans, to counter, put a force of three hundred hoplites on 
the island. Th is would help them control the bay, and, they intended, 
to help shut off  the fort from seaborne support. Cleon, boasting in 
Athens that he could bring the Spartans off  Sphacteria dead or alive 
in 20 days, was given an expe ditionary command to fulfi ll his boast. 
What force did he take? He, too, had learned Demosthenes’ lesson of 
Aig ition. He took no hoplites at all, just spearmen and archers!
Sharing the command with De mosthenes, who was afraid to come 
home after Aigition, Cleon succeeded.
Cleon and Demosthenes put a small force of heavy infantry on one 
end of the island, but never moved them. Th ey were bait. Th e Spar-
tan heavies, seeing their enemy, boldly marched to battle. Th e Athe-
nians didn’t move. Th e Spartan heavies had to cover all the distance 
themselves.
Th ey never got there. Th e archers were stationed in clusters at the 
fl anks, with light-armed akontistai, and slingers. Secure in the doc-
trine that the real battle happened when hoplite lines met, the Spar-
tans marched through a gauntlet of arrows and slung spears. Th ucy-
dides relates “Th e Spartan hel met was not proof against penetration 
by arrows!””
   Th e surviving Spartans retreated, taking refuge in an old aban-
doned fort on some high ground. Th is gave them a breather until 
a body of archers found a way around to the other side. Th eir fi re 
quickly made the Spartan position hopeless. At this point, Demos-
thenes and Cleon, seeing that the Spartans would all die, gave the re-
maining Spar tans a chance to surrender.
Much to everyone’s surprise, they did. It was the fi rst time a Spar-
tan force had ever done it. It created quite a stir throughout the 
Greek-speaking world. People could not believe that the live Spar-
tans were as brave as the dead ones. And Athenian, expressing such 
a thought to the prisoners, got this re sponse: “Th e arrow would be 
quite a weapon if it just killed the brave.” 
Archers can defeat hoplites. 
Strange to relate, this seems to be the only fi ghting in classical 
Greek his tory of hoplites against archers. Fur ther, it was the greatest 
victory on land that the Athenians ever won in the en tire war (431–
405 B.C.). Sphacteria dem onstrated the decisiveness of the arch ers’ 
advantage over heavy infantry. Yet this seems never to have been fol-
lowed up until the age of the English longbow.
Demosthenes and Cleon learned from Aigition and produced 
Sphacteria, but Sphacteria produced, among the Greeks, no strate-
gic off spring. It was too diffi  cult to break out of the idea that the real 
battle was always when the heavies met the heavies. Th e least intel-
ligent use of archers seems, when it appears, to be the typical way: re-
lating one major Syracusan battle, Th ucydides states the light-armed 
(spearmen, arch ers, cavalry) fought fi rst and it went this way and that, 
“as light-armed battles do,” and then the battle took place when the 
hoplite forces met. Th is is just a matter of letting the shrinking range 
between two oncoming forces dictate the type of soldier and the type 
of weapon used: fi rst, the long range sol diers and long range weapons; 
then the toe-to-toe soldiers and their toe-to-toe weapons.
The light armed trooper to naked but for his shield and helmet.
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If the archer can defeat the hop lite, why was this lesson lost upon 
the Greeks? Probably because they had so decisively defeated the Per-
sians, whose main weapon was the bow. We must ask how.
We get the clearest view of the fi ghting of Greek hoplites with Per-
sians in Herodotus’ description of the battle of Plataea in 480.
Th is was the fi nal battle of the Persian Wars, and fi rst it looked 
like it was going pretty well for the Persians. Th eir mounted archers 
kept milling around the encamped Greek army. Herodotus and the 
Greeks at the time looked upon these losses as wasted, lost “before 
the battle even started!” Pausanias, the commander of the Greek forc-
es, kept sacrifi cing as the arrows were coming in, waiting until the 
omens were auspicious. Finally, the lobes of the livers looked right, 
and the Greek heavies advanced.
Th ey faced an army that tried to combine the archer and the toe-
to-toe warrior. Th e Persians kept shooting at the advancing hoplites 
until they were too close; they then had to prepare to welcome the 
Greeks hand-to-hand. But as archers, they had put their shield down. 
You can’t hold a hugh heavy shield on your left hand and still shoot a 
bow; so the Persian style was to set their shield down together, mak-
ing a barricade of them. Th e Greeks marched through the shield bar-
ricade. Th e Per sians fought Greek heavies while shieldless themselves. 
It was a slaughter. Greek sources glory in the valor of the Greek hop-
lites. Yes, they did have the machismo to march through arrows, but 
if archers let heavies close with them, the result is foregone.
From their glorious victory over the land forces of the Persian 
army, the Greeks, I believe, learned some of the wrong lessons. Permit 
me a what-if: what if Mardonius, the Persian general, had realized his 
mounted archers were on to a good thing, and just left the Greeks to 
them, keeping the host out of range, except to keep the mounted arch-
ers supplied with arrows? Th is, of course, is precisely how the Par-
thians under Surena defeated Crassus, the Roman Proconsul of Syr-
ia and his Roman Legions at Carrhae in 53 B.C. It would also have 
worked in 480.
For an army on the march, the archer, and then the spear slinger, 
were the fi rst line of defense against ambush. Th roughout the Greek 
historians, one sees a force marching through suspi cious territory and 
the commanding offi  cer giving the order that the “spearmen march with 
the spear on the throng, and the archers with the arrow on the string.”
An attendant keeps an Assyrian mounted archer supplied with arrows.
An akontistes spearman (as edited for appearance in a 1912 
school text of Xenophon) from a Greek wine bowl.
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Where the ancient Greeks best perceived the need for archers was 
when an expeditionary force came to them: if an ancient city knew a 
siege was facing them, what preparations would they make? As Mity-
lene prepares to secede from the Athenian Empire (428) we see the 
city taking three preparations to undergo a siege: one was to buy 
grain, second was to raise the height of the walls, and the third was to 
bring in archers from Th race.
In a siege, the defenders always have the height advantage. Th ey 
are throwing or shooting from the city walls, the off ense is shooting 
from the ground. Mathematically, the height advantage goes with the 
square root of two. If, for instance, you are shooting from twice as 
high, your arrow goes 1.414 times as far. If you are on a battlement 
50 feet high, and your opponent is shooting from fi ve feet high, your 
arrow goes seven times farther than his. (Th is is purely mechanical, 
ignoring aerodynamics.)
Th e bow, among the Greeks, was the principal weapon for the city 
besieged. Th e bow being so eff ective in this situation explains why the 
fi rst advance in ancient siege machinery was the movable tower. Th is 
is the inven tion of Dionysius of Syracuse. You build it out of range, 
as high as the city walls, or even higher, armor the front with hides, 
move it up and give your archers a fair chance to clear the city walls. 
Here, for once, is a situation where archers are fi ghting archers as the 
main event in ancient Greece. Th ough siege-towers were constructed 
out of range, their could always be over-achievers: Philip II, king of 
Macedon (359-336) and fa ther of Alexander the Great, was inspect-
ing siege-works when he got his most famous wound: an arrow from 
the city walls knocked his eye out.
Archers on city walls turned many a tide, as victori ous besiegers 
routed a city’s land forces, and, in the excitement of pursuit, got too 
close to the city walls! Xenophon presents one such instance, as but 
the most recent of many such cases, relating the death of Teleutias. 
Teleutias was an en terprising Spartan general. Th e Ephors of Spar-
ta, having complete faith in him, sent him to take charge of the war 
A Slinger.
Persian foot soldier
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against Olynthus, on the northern shores of the Aegean Sea. Part of 
his forces were en gaged in destroying the Olynthian gar dens, farms, 
and orchards, as the other warded off  Olynthian cavalry and light-
armed troops who would try to prevent them. Angered by the success 
of some Olynthian rangers against his own, he commanded his more 
mobile forces to pursue the Olynthians and keep pursu ing them, 
backing them up with an advance of hoplites marching in their line.
Th eir hot pursuit took them within shooting distance of the city 
walls. Th e defending archers, seeing their chance, waited for a bit of 
committing space, and then decimated the Spartan forces. As the 
Spartans withdrew, the Olynthi ans then sent out a counter-attack, 
and turned the withdrawal of the Spartan forces into a route. Xeno-
phon, intro ducing the episode, observes that a “Force pursuing up to 
a city often has diffi  culty getting away.” His epilogue is that “A com-
mander must never issue an order in the heat of anger.”
Archers are absolutely necessary for the besieged to cover any 
sneak at tacks upon the besieging lines. Th ere are three such events in 
Th ucydides’ cov erage of the Peloponnesian War. Th e is land of Melos 
(where the Venus de Milo was found) was outside the Athenians’ em-
pire of islands, and they wanted it in. Th ey, therefore, besieged its city. 
Th eir technique, since the city of Melos was well upland from its har-
bor, was to build a wall completely around it. Twice the Melians suc-
cessfully raided the magazine of the Athenian line, escaping back into 
the town with supplies stolen from the Athenians. Th e how of this 
is vis ible in Th ucydides’ narration of the break-out of the Plataeans. 
Th e Spartans besieged Plataea, most of whose citizens were living in 
Athens, having re treated there because of the war. At the time of the 
siege (428), the town was a garrison of 400 soldiers, and 120 women 
to bake their bread. Sparta put a double wall around it; one against 
the Plataeans, one outside against any relieving force from Athens. 
On each side of the double wall was a ditch. Th ere were ten towers 
interrupting both sides of the double wall and fl ush with the outside 
of the double wall, which served as observation and strong points. 
Th e Plataeans decided on a breakout.
Th ey prepared ladders and awaited a moonless and stormy night. 
Th at winter, a hard freezing storm came up that fi lled the bill. Th e 
Spartans took shelter in the towers, leaving the walls unmanned. 
Armed for traveling, 200 Pla taeans made the attempt. As they went 
up and either went over or took watch positions on the wall, the 
storm covered any noise they made until a lookout on a tower roof 
knocked down a rooftile. As the Spartans came out to investigate, ar-
chers from rooftops and from the ditches shot down the on coming 
Spartans, aiming at the parts not covered by armor.
Th e Plataeans remaining in the town raised a racket at the op-
posite side of the ring to confuse the Spartan besiegers. Th e Spar-
tan force in fi rst line of readiness then came up; in credibly, they were 
holding torches to light the way.
Th e Plataeans, by going at fi rst into enemy territory be fore cutting 
around to get to Athens, eluded pursuit. Th e breakout was one of the 
great successes of the war. “Th ere was only one loss,” Th ucydides re-
cords, “an archer at the last ditch.” It is left to us to fi gure that this is 
the last of the rear guard, an unnamed hero who stayed back to keep 
cutting off  the Spartan pur suit until he himself was taken.
We must presume that the two successful commando raids of the 
Melians were similarly a matter of time-consuming action taken un-
der arch ery cover, and that there, too, were also anonymous archer 
heroes.
